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DISCOVERABILITY OF AN INSURED'S POST-ACCIDENT
STATEMENT TO INSURER IN WASHINGTON-Heidebrink v.
Moriwaki, 104 Wn. 2d 392, 706 P.2 212 (1985)
In Heidebrink v. Moriwakil the Washington Supreme Court held that a
recorded statement made by an insured party to his or her liability insur-
ance carrier following an accident is protected from discovery by the work
product rule. 2 Because the defendant's statement satisfied the other thresh-
old requirements for work product protection, the determinative issue in
Heidebrink was whether the statement had been prepared in "anticipation
of litigation."' 3 The court answered this question affirmatively with a
rationale based on policy considerations derived not from work product
doctrine but from common law privilege doctrine. Because this privilege
rationale focused on the preexisting relationship between insured and
insurer, the Heidebrink court failed to reach the underlying factors directly
relevant to the question of what constitutes anticipation of litigation in a
post-accident insurance investigation. 4
Courts have struggled, under both a privilege theory and pure work
product doctrine analysis, with the difficulties of reconciling a broad
discovery policy with the needs of an insured for confidentiality. Facing this
difficulty, the Heidebrink court blurred the distinctions between privilege
1. 104 Wn. 2d 392, 706 P.2d 212 (1985).
2. Id. at 401, 706 P.2d at 217. Washington's work product rule is codified in Civil Rule 26(b)(3),
which reads in part:
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule
[subdivision (b)(4) deals with experts], a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible
things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including
his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
NVAsH. Civ. R. 26(b)(3). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The second paragraph of the rule deals with
the ability of any person or party to obtain a copy of their own statement.
3. Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at 396, 706 P.2d at 215. Although an adverse party can compel
disclosure of protected "ordinary" work product through a proper showing of substantial need, see
infra notes 19-21, the party seeking discovery in Heidebrink was unable to make such a showing. 104
Wn. 2d at 402, 706 P.2d at 218. Ordinary or "factual" work product encompasses materials of purely
factual nature prepared by or for an attorney for use in litigation. "Opinion" work product includes
materials containing an .attorney's mental impressions, opinions, conclusions or legal theories. 4 J.
MooRE & J. LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrCE 26.64[2], at 361-62 (4th ed. 1984); see also
Wolfson, Opinion WorkProduct-Solving the Dilemma of CompelledDisclosure, 64 NEB. L. REv. 248,
250 (1985). This Note addresses only the discoverability of ordinary work product.
4. See infra notes 81-106 and accompanying text.
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and work product immunity, potentially impeding the application of either.
The Heidebrink court could have focused on the events triggering the
insurance investigation, rather than on the insured-insurer relationship.
This focus would provide meaningful guidance to lower courts, and would
avoid undesirable consequences stemming from integration of privilege
considerations with work product analysis.
I. THE INDEPENDENT DOCTRINES OF WORK PRODUCT AND
PRIVILEGE
A. Modern Work Product Doctrine
Contrary to the common law, which allowed little discovery, 5 the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, provided for discovery in
federal courts of "any matter. . . relevant to the subject matter" that was
not privileged. 6 Federal courts, however, encountered difficulty in deter-
mining the extent to which a lawyer's "work product" was discoverable
within this framework. 7
The Supreme Court introduced modern work product doctrine in
Hickman v. Taylor. 8 In Hickman, the Court held that statements of nonparty
witnesses taken by an attorney several days after an accident, though not
privileged, 9 were conditionally immune from discovery. 10 Although the
Court called for broad and liberal treatment of the discovery rules,'I it
limited intrusion into an attorney's files in order to prevent "inefficiency,
5. Prior to the nineteenth century, pretrial discovery devices were essentially nonexistent except for
letters or deeds relied upon in the pleadings. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1858, at 568 (J. Chadboum rev.
1976).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Privilege has the same meaning in discovery matters as in evidentiary
ones. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953). See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2022, at 186 (1972). The work product doctrine, described infra text accompanying notes
8-41, now also limits the scope of permissible discovery.
7. The term "work product of the lawyer" first appeared in the opinion by the circuit court of
appeals in Hickman v. Taylor and was defined as "intangible things, the result of the lawyer's use of his
tongue, his pen, and his head, for his client." 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 329 U.S. 495
(1947). Prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Hickman, see infra text accompanying notes 8-13, various
lower federal courts rendered over 60 conflicting decisions on this issue. 4 J. MOORE, supra note 3,
26.63[4], at 312. Courts frequently denied discovery of "work product" materials. See, e.g., Poppino
v. Jones Stone Co., I F.R.D. 215 (W.D. Mo. 1940); McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585 (E.D.N.Y.
1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 680 (1940); Kenealy v. Texas Co., 29 F.
Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
8. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
9. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508.
10. Id. at 514 (though discovery could be had in proper circumstances, the Court declined to permit
discovery as a matter of unqualified right).
11. Id. at 507.
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unfairness, and sharp practices" within the legal profession. 12 Discovery of
work product would be permitted only for "good cause."
13
In 1970 the Supreme Court adopted Federal Civil Rule 26(b)(3) 14 to
clarify confusion that had arisen subsequent to Hickman regarding discov-
ery of trial preparation materials. 15 Rule 26(b)(3) codifies the principles of
work product doctrine established under Hickman.16 In 1972, Washington
adopted Federal Civil Rule 26(b)(3) verbatim to govern work product
discovery in its courts. 17 A party seeking to invoke work product immunity
under Rule 26(b)(3) must meet three criteria. The materials must: (1) be
documents or other tangible things; (2) be prepared in anticipation of
litigation or trial; and (3) be prepared by or for the party seeking protection
or by or for that party's representative. 18
Rule 26(b)(3) codifies the good cause requirement announced in
Hickman19 as a two part test to determine when protected work product is
12. Id.at511.
13. Id. at 512. The Court stated that a burden rests on that party who seeks to compel production of
protected materials. The magnitude of that burden is "implicit in the rules as now constituted." Id. The
Court hinted at which "rules" it considered applicable in a footnote referring to FEDERAL CIVIL RULE 34
and the "good cause" requirement therein. Id. at 512 n.10. Because the Court declined to make the
burden explicit, the good cause requirement of Hickman resulted in three different burdens under the
label of "good cause," depending on what type of materials were sought: (1) proof of good cause as
mere relevance under Rule 34 (as then constituted) to discover nonprivileged, nonwork product
materials; (2) proof of good cause as hardship or necessity to discover ordinary or factual work product,
see supra note 3; or (3) proof of good cause consisting of some measure of extreme need that rarely, if
ever, would be met, to discover an attorney's mental impressions. See Comment, Ambiguities After the
1970 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery of Experts and
Attorney's Work Product, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 1145, 1156-57 (1971).
14. See supra note 2.
15. See Trautman, Discovery in Washington, 47 WASH. L. REV. 409, 414 (1972); see also
Comment, supra note 13, at 1158 (discussion of the major problems concerning discovery of trial
preparation materials identified by the Advisory Committee).
16. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,398 (1981). The purposes and policies of Hickman,
therefore, are relevant to efforts to apply the rule. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
17. WASH. Ctv. R. 26(b)(3); see supra note 2. Prior to adopting the federal rule in Washington, the
Washington rules provided: "The court need not order the production or inspection of any writing
obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of
litigation or in preparation for trial." Wash. Civ. R. 26(b), 71 Wn. 2d lxvii (1967). Although never
interpreted by the state supreme court, the rule left the issue to the discretion of the trial judge and
required good cause before allowing discovery. Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at 396, 706 P.2d at 214.
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); WASH. Civ. R. 26(b)(3); see supra note 2. The Rule specifically
includes insurance companies as permissible representatives of a party protected under the Rule. The
Rule makes no distinction between attorney and nonattorney work product. Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at
396, 706 P.2d at 214-15.
19. See supra note 13 for description of the good cause requirements under Hickman. See also
Comment, supra note 13, at 1160-61 (discussion of the problems associated with general guidelines for
good cause under Hickman).
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discoverable. 20 An adverse party must make a sufficient showing of sub-
stantial need for the materials, coupled with an inability to obtain the
material's substantial equivalent without undue hardship. 2 1
1. The Anticipation of Litigation Requirement
In the initial determination of whether the work product rule protects any
given material from discovery, courts applying Rule 26(b)(3) have found
the anticipation of litigation prong particularly troublesome. Courts have
used a variety of standards to evaluate the requirement and, consequently, a
large number of inconsistent rulings have emerged. 22
The anticipation of litigation question has also divided federal and state
courts interpreting Federal Civil Rule 26(b)(3), or its state equivalent, in
the narrower context of insurance investigations. 23 Courts disagree over
whether, in the absence of a specific pending claim, a liability insurer
conducts its initial post-accident investigation in anticipation of litigation.
Courts making such determinations have relied on a variety of factors,
20. Only ordinary work product is discoverable under Rule 26(b)(3). See supra note 3 for a
definition of "ordinary" work product.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); WASH. Civ. R. 26(b)(3). Whether such a showing has been made is a
wholly discretionary determination made by trial judge. 4 J. MOORE, supra note 3, 26.64[3.-I], at
362. See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Fel-Pro, Inc., 667 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1981) (sufficient showing where
crucial information is in exclusive control of adverse party); Gay v. P.K. Lindsay Co., 666 F.2d 710 (1st
Cir. 1981) (sufficient showing generally cannot be made where declarant is available for deposition);
McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1972) (statement contemporaneous with occurrence found
to be unique, no substantial equivalent available); Rackers v. Siegfried, 54 F.R.D. 24 (W.D. Mo. 1971)
(plaintiff had substantial need of documents since no sufficient alternative source existed from which he
could obtain the same information); see also C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2025, at 211-28
(general discussion of what showing satisfies substantial need test).
22. See infra notes 24, 25, 28, 30, and 32 and accompanying text for examples of cases basing
decisions on a variety of criteria. One commentator advocates that courts consider, in each determina-
tion, all factors upon which anticipation of litigation decisions have been based. Comment, Work
Product Discovery: A Multifactor Approach to the Anticipation of Litigation Requirement on Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), 66 IOwA L. REV. 1277, 1277-79 (1981). The author sets out five
categories of factors: (1) the nature of the event; (2) inferences from contents; (3) who requested or
prepared the materials; (4) routine preparation and purposes served thereby; and (5) time prepared. Id.
at 1287.
23. Compare, e.g., Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co., 395 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. La. 1974); Ashmead v.
Harris, 336 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 1983); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McAlpine, 120 R.I. 744, 391 A.2d 84
(1978) (each finding investigation materials to be within scope of Rule), with Westhemco Ltd. v. New
Hampshire Ins. Co., 82 F.R.D. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna
Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367, (N.D. Il. 1972); Henry Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 225 Kan. 615, 592 P.2d 915
(1979); Khoudary v. Home Ins. Co., 77 Misc. 2d 864, 355 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1974) (each finding
investigative materials not covered by rule). See also Comment, Discovering Investigative Reports
Under the Work Product Doctrine, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 156, at 156, 160 (1982).
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leading to different results in similar situations. 24 Among these are courts
that have based their decisions on the nature of the event stimulating
investigation and the likelihood that it could result in litigation. 2 However,
many courts have used this mode of analysis to merely rephrase the
question, rather than to focus on the precipitating event and surrounding
circumstances that led to the investigation. 26 As a result, these efforts have
provided little guidance to subsequent courts. 27
A number of courts have found other criteria to be dispositive in inter-
preting Rule 26(b)(3). Courts have held that materials prepared in the
"ordinary course of business" of insurance investigation are outside the
scope of materials protected by the Rule. 28 Other courts and commentators
strongly criticize the ordinary course of business exception to Rule
24. Compare, e.g., Henry Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 225 Kan. 615, 592 P.2d 915 (1979) (statement of
defendant corporation's principal officer, taken by corporation's insurance carrier with knowledge of
potential claims, was outside scope of work product rule because it was not requested by legal counsel
and was made in the ordinary course of business), with Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McAlpine, 120 R.I.
744, 391 A.2d 84 (1978) (post-accident statement of insured party found to be within scope of work
product rule because when an insured reports an incident involving another party, the nature of the event
gives rise to a reasonable anticipation of litigation). See also infra notes 25, 28, 30, and 32 and
accompanying text for additional court treatment of the anticipation of litigation question.
25. Ashmead v. Harris, 336 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 1983); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McAlpine, 120
R.I. 744, 391 A.2d 84 (1978). For analagous cases involving intracompany accident investigations see
also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979); Almgauerv. Chicago, R.I. & P.
R.R., 55 F.R.D. 147, 149 (D. Neb. 1972). Professors Wright and Miller have proposed a test for any
anticipation of litigation determination under Rule 26(b)(3) which factors in the nature of the events
giving rise to the investigation. They ask: "whether, in light of the nature of the document and the
factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained
because of the prospect of litigation." C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2024, at 198.
26: See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979) ("some
possibility" of litigation); Home Ins. Co. v. Ballenger Corp., 74 F.R.D. 93, 101 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
("substantial probability" of "imminent litigation"); see also Comment, supra note 22, at 1277-79
(asserting that this tautology adds little substance to the analysis).
27. Fontaine v. Sunflower Beef Carrier, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 89, 92 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
28. McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d 468,473 (4th Cir. 1972); Westhemeco Ltd. v. New Hampshire
Ins. Co., 82 F.R.D. 702, 708-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Transamerica
Ins. Co., 61 F.R.D. 115, 118 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54
F.R.D. 367, 372 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Henry Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 225 Kan. 615,623,592 P.2d 915, 920
(1979). For analagous cases involving intracompany investigations see also Soeder v. General Dynam-
ics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 253, 255 (D. Nev. 1980); Rakus v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R., 76 F.R.D. 145, 146
(W.D.N.Y. 1977). The phrase "ordinary course of business" does not appear in Rule 26(b)(3). The
exception apparently owes its origin to language in the Advisory Committee notes on the Rule stating:
"materials assembled in the ordinary course of business . . . are not under the qualified immunity
provided by [Rule 26(b)(3)]." FED. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Comm. note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501 (1970).
However, the Advisory Committee's statement is poorly supported. Comment, The Work Product
Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 760, 849 (1983). It is possible that when the statement was made, the
drafters were contemplating the undesirable situation in which large quantities of preexisting business
records might become protected from discovery merely because the materials were later turned over to
an attorney.
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26(b)(3) immunity. 29 Courts have also required prior involvement by an
attorney before allowing work product immunity for investigation mate-
rials. 30 This, however, adds requirements not found in the plain language of
the Rule. 31 Finally, at least one court has required that specific legal claims
exist before investigative materials are protected. 32 However, in a case
before the Supreme Court, materials prepared prior to the existence of any
specific claims received work product immunity. 33 Reliance by courts on
such a variety of standards when making anticipation of litigation deter-
minations under Rule 26(b)(3) has resulted in confused application of the
Rule.34
2. Policies and Scope of Work Product Doctrine
The Hickman Court sought to protect the integrity of the trial process and
thereby the adversarial system of justice through work product doctrine. 35
29. See Carver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 94 F.R.D. 131, 134 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (a hard and fast rule is
contrary to the goals of modern discovery); Fontaine v. Sunflower Beef Carrier, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 89, 92
(E.D. Mo. 1980) (ordinary course of business exception "twists the language of the Rule so as not to
bestow upon insurance companies an allegedly undeserved benefit"); Spaulding v. Denton, 68 F.R.D.
342, 345-46 (D. Del. 1975) (any rule of thumb approach is contrary to drafter's intent); Comment,
supra note 23, at 165 (routine accident investigation is often prompted by a justifiable anticipation of
future litigation); Comment, supra note 28, at 848,853-55 (1983) (asserting that the ordinary course of
business exception jeopardizes the goals of work product doctrine and that courts should instead follow
the Rule 26(b)(3) framework); Comment, supra note 22, at 1294 (ordinary course of business exception
overlooks possibility that routine practices may result from a desire to be adequately prepared for
litigation).
30. Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367, 372 (N.D. II1. 1972);
Henry Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 225 Kan. 615, 623, 592 P.2d 915, 920 (1979). For analagous cases
involving intracompany or internal government agency investigations see also Sterling Drug Inc. v.
Harris, 488 F. Supp. 1019, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 402 (E.D. Va. 1975).
31. See supra notes 2 and 18; see also 4 J. MOORE & J. LucAS, supra note 3, 26.64[2], at 358-60
(involvement by an attorney is not a prerequisite to protection under Rule 26(b)(3)).
32. Hawkins v. District Court, 638 P.2d 1372, 1379 (Colo. 1982). For analagous cases involving
intracompany or internal government agency investigative reports see also Coastal States Gas Corp. v.
Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Kent Corp. v. NLRB. 530 F.2d 612,623-24
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 64 F.R.D. 688, 690
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
33. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The materials protected were prepared during an
investigation made before the adversary party was even aware of the circumstances that led to litigation.
Id. at 386-87, 397. In Upjohn, the government had conceded that the materials in question were within
the scope of Rule 26(b)(3), and instead the government asserted it had made a sufficient showing of
need to overcome the immunity. Id. at 399.
34. See Kent Corp. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 612,623 (5th Cir.) ("[Anticipation of litigation] is a phrase
that must be interpreted with caution, and the case law affords relatively little guidance. "), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 920 (1976); Fontaine v. Sunflower Beef Carrier, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 89, 91 (E.D. Mo. 1980)
("Confusion has reigned... as to what exactly is meant by that phrase."); see also Comment, supra
note 22, at 1277-78.
35. Proper preparation of a client's case demands that [the attorney] assemble information.
sift what he considers to be the relevant from irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his
1306
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The Court asserted that unrestricted discovery of trial preparation materials
would promote inefficient trial preparation. 36 Attorneys would hesitate to
commit materials to written form, and lack of privacy would demoralize
attorneys. 37 Modern courts also reiterate that work product doctrine serves
to protect the adversary role of the attorney, through preserving the privacy
of trial preparation materials.38
Work product protection serves interests of both attorney and client;
therefore, it may be asserted independently by either.39 Those interests,
however, will not always outweigh the need of adverse parties for disclosure
of relevant material unobtainable elsewhere.40 Courts have labeled work
product protection a "qualified immunity," rather than a form of "priv-
ilege. 4 '
B. Attorney-Client Privilege and Insured-Insurer Communications
Although work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege both func-
tion to protect materials from discovery, the two concepts are separate and
strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the historical and the necessary way in
which lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to
protect their client's interests.
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511; see also Comment, The WorkProduct Doctrine in Subsequent Litigation, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 412, 425-28 (1983). The Comment identifies protection of the adversary system and
maintaining the integrity of the trial process as the primary interests of concern to the Hickman Court. It
further separates the latter category into three components: (1) adequate trial preparation, (2) ethical
trial preparation, and (3) the potential calling of the attorney as witness at the client's trial. Id.
36. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511; see also Comment, supra note 22, at 1282-83 (discussion of
protected interests identified by the Hickman Court).
37. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
38. In re Sealed Case, 676 E2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (work product doctrine protects the
vitality of the adversary system); United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (work
product immunity exists to promote the adversary system by safeguarding trial preparation materials
from the discovery attempts of the opponent); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Departmentt of Energy, 617
F2d 854, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (work product purpose is to protect the adversary trial process); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979) (overriding purpose of work
product doctrine is to encourage proper functioning of the adversary system); see also Comment, supra
note 28, at 784.
39. In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982);In re Special
Sept. 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49, 62 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F2d 798,
801 (3d Cir. 1979) (in addition to the lawyer's right to assert the work product privilege, clients may do
so to the extent their interests are affected). But see Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F. R.D. 718, 725
n.7 (N.D. IIl. 1978) (work product immunity may be invoked only by the attorney); see also, Comment,
supra note 28, at 869-80. Both views emphasize the attorney's interest in protection, while attorney-
client privilege emphasizes the client's interest. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
40. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. See also Comment, Discovery and the Work Product Doctrine, 11
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 863, 866 (1980).
41. American Standard, Inc., v. Bendix Corp., 71 F.R.D. 443,446 (W.D. Mo. 1976); International
Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 186 (M.D. Fla. 1973); see also C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 6, § 2025, at 212.
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distinct. 42 The two doctrines reflect very different policy considerations,
cover different, though occasionally overlapping, types of materials, and
enjoy different amounts of immunity.
1. Policies and Scope of Attorney-Client Privilege
Society's interest in safeguarding certain confidential relationships pro-
vides the justification for the use of privileges. 43 The attorney-client priv-
ilege encourages full disclosure by clients, allowing their representatives to
better serve their interests. 44 Certain limits, however, qualify use of the
privilege. Because attorney-client privilege benefits only the client, only
the client may assert it. 45 The materials which are privileged receive
absolute protection. 46 However, the privilege protects only communica-
tions between attorney and client which are intended to be confidential. 47
Although well established, 48 attorney-client privilege has been criticized
by legal scholars. 49 Courts tend to construe the privilege narrowly, and to
42. Handguards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976); see also,
Wolfson, supra note 3, at 253.
43. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OFEVIDENCE 72, at 171 (E. Cleary 3d
ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. See, e.g., Coburn v. Seda, 101 Wn. 2d 270, 274.677 P.2d
173, 176 (1984) ('[Alttorney-client privilege has its basis in the confidential nature of the communica-
tion and seeks to foster a relationship deemed socially desirable. "); see also Comment, supra note 40,
at 866.
44. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); State v. Chervenell. 99 Wn. 2d 309, 316,
662 P.2d 836, 840 (1983). "[I]n order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients,
the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed..."). J. WIGMORE.
EVIDENCE § 2291, at 545 (McNaughton rev. 1961)
45. J. WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 2231, at 629. Under the original theory of attorney-client
privilege, protection was found in the attorney, not the client. This is no longer the case. Id. Numerous
courts have held that attorney-client privilege belongs to the client alone. E.g., Moody v. IRS, 654 F.2d
795, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir.
1979); Martin v. Shean, 22 Wn. 2d 505, 511, 156 P.2d 681, 684 (1945) (privilege is personal to client).
46. See International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 180 (M.D. Fla. 1973);
Kirkland v. Morton Salt Co., 46 F.R.D. 28, 30 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Comment, supra note 40, at 864-66.
The federal rule explicitly excludes privileged materials from the scope of permissible discovery. See
supra note 6 and accompanying text. The privilege may be waived, such as when privileged matter is
disclosed to an unnecessary third party. These determinations, however, do not involve the discretion-
ary weighing of interests used to compel discovery of work product. See supra notes 19-21 and
accompanying text.
47. J.WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 2292, at 554. See Ramsey v. Mading, 36 Wn. 2d 303, 311-12,
217 P.2d 1041, 1046, (1950); see also infra note 54 (agency and confidential communications).
48. "The history of [attorney-client] privilege goes back to the reign of Elizabeth 1,-where [it]
already appears as unquestioned." J. WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 2290, at 545; MCCORMICK, supra
note 43, § 87, at 204-05 (early English doctrine protected the attorney from forced disclosure of the
client's secrets).
49. See J. WGMORE, supra note 44. § 2291, at 554. Wigmore, though defending the privilege,
stated: "[Ilts benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete." Id. See also
MCCORMICK, supra note 43, § 72, at 172 ("[Elven if the importance of given interests and relationships
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deny protection where the benefits are slight, or costs are unusually high. 50
2. Extension of Attorney-Client Privilege to Insured-Insurer
Communications
A split of authority has arisen regarding the applicability of attorney-
client privilege to post-accident insured-insurer communications. Federal
courts have refused to extend attorney-client privilege to an insured's
statement made to the insurer in an accident investigation. 5 1 A majority of
state courts, however, have granted the privilege, barring discovery of post-
accident insured-insurer statements, through an agency theory.52 Courts
doing so have been influenced by the insured's expectation of con-
fidentiality and his or her contractual obligation to disclose fully all facts to
the insurer.53
An agency theory extending attorney-client privilege to insured-insurer
communications regards the insurance company as a party necessary for
transmitting the information from the client to the selected attorney.54 The
be conceded, there remain questions as to whether evidentiary privileges are appropriate .. .
mechanisms for accomplishing the desired objectives.").
50. See, e.g., Dike v. Dike, 75 Wn. 2d 1, 10-11, 448 P.2d 490,496 (1968) ("[T]he privilege...
must be strictly limited to the purpose for which it exists."); Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. 89, 97 (1831)
("The rule of privilege, having a tendancy to prevent full disclosure of the truth, ought to be construed
strictly."); see also J. WiGMORE, supra note 44, § 2291, at 554 (advocating strict construction of the
privilege); Comment, Discovery of an Insured's Statement to the Agent of His Insurer in an Accident
Report Situation, 11 VAL. U.L. REv. 91, 93-94 (1976).
51. E.g., Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Affiliated F.M. Ins. Co., 64 F.R.D. 694 (E.D. Wis. 1974);
Jackson v. Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. W.Va. 1970); Gottlieb v. Bresler, 24
F.R.D. 371 (D.C. 1959). See also Comment, supra note 47, at 104 n.85 for additional cases, and at
104-06 for critique of the federal court's position.
52. See, e.g., State exrel. Cain v. Barker, 540 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1976); Brakhage v. Graff, 190 Neb.
53, 206 N.W.2d 45 (1973); Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1949). See Comment,
supra note 50, at 106 n.92 for additional cases.
53. See, e.g., People v. Ryan, 30 111. 2d 456, 458, 197 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1964) (insured properly has
an expectation that communication with the insurer is for dominant purpose of transmission to an
attorney to protect the insured's interests); Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782, 784-85
(1949) (insured is bound by contract to make a complete report to the carrier and should not be
discouraged from doing so by fear of unauthorized disclosure); see also, Comment, supra note 50, at
109 (courts have found the intent and reasonable expectations of the insured to be interests worth
protecting).
54. See, e.g., Peoplev. Ryan, 30111. 2d456, 197 N.E.2d 15,17 (1964); Brakhagev. Graft, 190Neb.
53, 206 N.W.2d 45, 48 (1973); Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782, 785-86 (1949).
Privileged communications may be handled only by those agents reasonably necessary for transmission
to the attorney. See Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37, 7 So. 302, 313 (1889); Davenport Co. v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 166 Pa. 480,31 A. 245,246 (1895). Note also that under the agency theory, it is necessary to show
that the statement was recorded for the purpose of communication to an attorney. Communications
arising independently of that purpose are "preexisting" papers, and not privileged even if later
entrusted to an attorney. Edison Elec. Light Co. v. United States Elec. Lighting Co., 44 F. 294, 298
(C.C.N.Y. 1890); Parkhurst v. City of Cleveland, 77 N.E.2d 735, 737 (Ohio C.P. 1947); see also
Comment, supra note 50, at 95-101.
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privilege applies even though the particular attorney who will represent the
insured has not been ascertained. 55 Courts refusing to extend the privilege
have criticized the agency theory on several grounds. These courts have
asserted that the absence of privilege would not cause the defendant to
withhold or alter his or her statement. 56 Thus, the benefit of the privilege, in
terms of encouraging disclosure, is minimal. In addition, courts have
reasoned that, in this instance, the costs of withholding materials, mea-
sured in terms of information potentially lost to the truth-finding process,
are exceedingly high. 57 Courts have also asserted that the right of the
insurance company to use the statement for purposes adverse to the client's
interest is inconsistent with a claim of privilege on his or her behalf.58
This conflict and confusion, then, surrounded the two doctrines when
the Washington Supreme Court considered the discoverability of insured-
insurer communications for the first time in Heidebrink v. Moriwaki.
II. HEIDEBRINK V. MORIWAKI: THE COURT'S DECISION
Defendant Moriwaki had been burning grain stubble on his farm, next to
the state highway near Moses Lake, Washington. 59 Plaintiff Heidebrink
was involved in an automobile collision, which she alleged was caused by
thick smoke from Moriwaki's field. 60 Two days later, Moriwaki's insurer
tape-recorded Moriwaki's statement regarding the matter. 61 Plaintiff sub-
sequently sought this statement through discovery. 62
The trial court ruled that the statement was not discoverable, but plaintiff
was granted discretionary review of the determination. 63 The Court of
55. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cain v. Barker, 540 S.W.2d 50, 56 (Mo. 1976); Brakhage v. Graff. 190
Neb. 53, 206 N.W.2d 45, 48 (1973); see also, Comment, supra note 50, at 98 (a statement taken for
eventual transmission to an attorney may contain the type of information the privilege seeks to protect.
even though the attorney-client relationship does not yet exist).
56. See, e.g., Jacobi v. Podevels, 23 Wis. 2d 152, 127 N.W.2d 73, 76 (1964) (since insured parties
are contractually obligated to cooperate, if they give false information, or otherwise refuse to cooperate,
they may forfeit their benefits under insurance contracts).
57. An eyewitness account recorded shortly after an accident has been called a "catalyst of unique
value in the development of the truth through the judicial process." De Bruce v. Pennsylvania R.R.. 6
F.R.D. 403, 406 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
58. E.g., Butler v. Doyle, 112 Ariz. 522, 544 P.2d 204, 207 (1975) (determinations regarding
coverage, renewal of insured's policy, and whether insured has fulfilled the obligation to cooperate may
result in use of the statement in a manner adverse to the client's interest); Jacobi v. Podevels, 23 Wis. 2d
152, 127 N.W.2d 73, 76 (1964) (insurer may use statement against insured).
59. Heidebrink v. Moriwaki. 104 Wn. 2d 392, 393, 706 P.2d 212, 213 (1985).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 394, 706 P.2d at 213.
62. Id.
63. Heidebrink v. Moriwaki, 38 Wn. App. 388, 389, 685 P.2d 1109, 1110 (1984).
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Appeals ordered production of the statement. 64 In a 6-3 decision, 65 the
Washington Supreme Court reversed and held that the statement was
protected under the work product immunity rule.66 The majority opinion
did not address the attorney-client privilege issue. 67 The dissent argued
against protection on any basis. 68
Analyzing the case under Washington's work product rule,69 the
Heidebrink court recognized that no distinction exists between attorney and
non-attorney work product.70 The court stated it would look to the specific
expectations of the involved parties in seeking the answer to the anticipa-
tion of litigation question. 71 The character of the contractual relationship
between the insured and insurer strongly influenced the court in defining
those expectations.
The court asserted that because insured persons are contractually obli-
gated to cooperate with their insurance companies, they reasonably expect
that statements made to an insurer, following an accident, will not be
revealed to opposing parties. 72 Because the contract between the parties
calls for the insurer to select and retain an attorney to defend against any
claims, the court stated, the insurer acts as the agent of the insured, and is
expected to transmit the statement, in confidence, to the attorney so
selected. 73 The court noted that, without an expectation of confidentiality,
the insured might hesitate to disclose everything known, possibly hinder-
ing representation by the selected attorney.74 Lack of confidentiality would
64. Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at 393, 706 P.2d at 213.
65. The majority opinion was written by Justice Pearson, with Dolliver, C.J., and Utter, Anderson,
Callow, and Durham, J.J., concurring. Goodloe, Brachtenbach, and Dore, J.J. dissented. Id. at 402,
706 P.2d at 218.
66. Id. at 393, 706 P.2d at 213.
67. Id. at 403, 706 P.2d at 218 (Goodloe, J., dissenting). The majority omitted discussion of the
attorney-client privilege issue in spite of the fact that amicus briefs had directed the court's attention to
this question. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. Although the majority initially stated the issue
as "whether the statement of an insured to his or her insurance company is protected by the attorney-
client privilege or the work product immunity rule," the majority opinion made no further reference to
attorney-client privilege. Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at 393, 706 P.2d at 213.
68. The dissent argued that attorney-client privilege should not apply unless the insured believes
that in making the statement he or she is either directly or indirectly consulting with an attorney for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice. Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at 407-8, 706 P.2d at 220 (Goodloe, J.,
dissenting). Moriwaki, the dissent asserted, had no such belief. Id. The dissent further argued that the
initial inquiry by the insurance company regarding a potential claim against the insured is not made in
anticipation of litigation for Rule 26(b)(3) purposes. Id. at 411, 706 P.2d at 222.
69. WASH. Civ. R. 26(b)(3); see supra note 2.
70. Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at 396, 706 P.2d at 214-15.
71. Id. at 400, 706 P.2d at 216.
72. Id. at 400, 706 P.2d at 217.
73. Id.
74. Id.
1311
Washington Law Review
cause the insured to bear the burdens of the insurance contract without
reaping its benefits. 75 The court asserted that if the statement had been
made directly to the selected attorney, it "obviously" would have been
made in anticipation of litigation, and thereby would be protected under
Rule 26(b)(3). 76 The court concluded that, therefore, the contractual rela-
tionship between insured and insurer "mandates" extension of this protec-
tion. 77 The court thus determined that Moriwaki's statement was prepared
in anticipation of litigation, and was therefore protected from discovery by
Rule 26(b)(3). 78 The court refused to order production of the statement,
because plaintiff Heidebrink failed to meet the "substantial need" test, as
required to overcome protection under the work product rule. 79
III. THE HEIDEBRINK COURT'S MISPLACED RELIANCE ON
PRIVILEGE CONSIDERATIONS IN WORK PRODUCT
DOCTRINE ANALYSIS
A. The Heidebrink Court Did Not Reach the Anticipation of Litigation
Question
The Heidebrink court purported to analyze the discoverability of in-
sured-insurer communications under work product doctrine. 80 Instead the
court slipped imperceptibly into attorney-client privilege analysis. As a
result, the court did not in fact reach the substance of the crucial anticipa-
tion of litigation question.
To come within the scope of work product protection, a sought-after
statement must be prepared in anticipation of litigation. 81 In determining
whether Moriwaki's statement was prepared in anticipation of litigation,
the Heidebrink court announced that it would look to the expectations of the
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 400-01, 706 P.2d at 217.
79. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for an explanation of the substantial need test. The
court reinstated the ruling of the trial court. Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at 402, 706 P.2d at 217. The court
found that although the statement was taken two days after the accident, the passage of time alone was
an insufficient showing to compel discovery. Id. In this respect, Washington has placed itself in
opposition to courts such as Pennsylvania's in De Bruce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 6 F.R.D. 403,406 (E.D.
Pa. 1947), which held that the value arising from the immediacy of a statement outweighs the harm to
attorney and client from disclosure. The Heidebrink court also indicated that the mere possibility the
document might reveal impeaching matter was insufficient to compel disclosure. 104 Wn. 2d at 402,
706 P.2d at 218.
80. Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at 399, 706 P.2d at 216 ("The specific issue at hand is whether an
insured's statement to his insurance carrier is protected from discovery by [the work product rule].").
81. 'See supra text accompanying note 18.
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involved parties.82 In doing so, however, the court chose to focus on
expectations arising from the preexisting contractual relationship between
Moriwaki and his insurer.8 3 The court then focused on the most legally
sensitive aspect of the relationship: the insured's interest in preserving
confidentiality. The court failed to address whether either the insured or
insurer expected that, because of the nature of the accident and surrounding
circumstances, the insured's statement might eventually be used for litiga-
tion purposes. Instead the Heidebrink court made the result dependent on
the identity of the declarant and the declarant's relationship to the insurer. 84
The phrase "anticipation of litigation" itself suggests that the dispositive
factor in the anticipation of litigation inquiry will be the motive for
gathering the materials in question. 85 The identity of the maker of a
statement, therefore, is relevant only to the extent that it demonstrates the
motive for recording the statement. 86 The anticipation of litigation inquiry
necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances giving rise to the
investigation which would shape the motives of those preparing the mate-
rials in question.87
The Heidebrink court's analysis did not look to motive, or the events
stimulating the investigation, but instead made a generalized analysis of the
insured-insurer relationship. 88 The court's rationale relied solely on an
82. Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at 400, 706 P.2d at 216.
83. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
84. Insurance investigators might take statements from nonparty witnesses who have no connec-
tion with the insurer. Such witnesses would have no expectation of confidentiality.
85. Logic dictates that in seeking to determine if a document was prepared in anticipation of
litigation, the inquiry must be whether anticipation of litigation, anticipation of some other event, or
some entirely different motivation caused the document to be brought into existence. However, a
number of motives may combine as the underlying impetus for the work product's inception. So long as
trial preparation constitutes one of these motives, the doctrine applies. See GAF Corp. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 85 ER.D. 46, 50-51 (S.D.N.Y. "1979) (documents prepared for use by government
attorneys in a separate civil investigation determined to have also been prepared in anticipation of
litigation for Rule 26(b)(3) purposes).
86. Although the Rule provides protection for materials prepared by parties, or by their insurers,
the underlying inquiry remains constant. Normally, the motive of whoever prepared the materials, or
directed their preparation, is at issue (the Rule requires materials be "prepared" in anticipation of
litigation, see supra note 2). However, when the insured party plays a role in the preparation of work
product materials by making the statement in question, the court may look to the insured's motivation in
making the statement, in addition to that of the insurance company in recording it. In spite of the
foregoing, the party resisting discovery still must show that the anticipation of litigation motivation
existed, in either the insured or the insurer, when the materials were prepared, see supra text
accompanying note 18. The Heidebrink court erred not in where it looked to find anticipation of
litigation, but rather in deciding what mental state satisfied the requirement. As a practical matter,
however, the required motivation will likely be found first, if at all, in the insurance company, because
of the insurer's greater experience in matters that result in litigation.
87. See Carver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 94 ER.D. 131, 134 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (anticipation of litigation
inquiry necessarily turns on the facts of each case); see also Comment, supra note 28, at 852.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
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expectation of confidentiality in the insured, arising from the contractual
obligation to cooperate with the insurance company.89 The court asserted
that failure to protect that expectation would endanger the insured's benefits
under the insurance contract. 90 This is because of the conflict between the
insured's desire to keep damaging information from adverse parties, and
the effect not disclosing all known facts to the insurer might have on the
insured. 9 1 While it is possible that the insured's expectation of privacy
arises because of a consciousness of impending litigation, such a theory
was not articulated by the court. 92 Because the court never determined the
motive for the preparation of the statement, 93 it never substantively reached
the anticipation of litigation question. Instead, the court took a path that
completely ignored the underlying policy of work product doctrine: safe-
guarding the trial preparation process. 94
The Heidebrink court's solution conceptually rested on the very core of
privilege doctrine. Encouraging full client disclosure by protecting con-
fidentiality is the primary purpose of attorney-client privilege. 95 The court
labeled the insurer as the agent of the insured who will eventually transmit
the statement to the selected attorney. 96 State courts extending attorney-
client privilege to insured-insurer statements offer the same rationale. 97
The Heidebrink court asserted that if the statement were made directly to
the selected attorney, it would have "obviously" been made in anticipation
of litigation. 98 The only "obvious" point, however, is that such a statement
89 Id.
90. Id.
91. The court stated that nondisclosure could hinder later representation by the attorney.
Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at 400, 706 P.2d at 217. The court was also motivated by the fact that insured
parties must disclose everything they know to the insurance company, or else possibly forfeit all benefits
under the contract. Id. at 400, 706 P.2d at 216. Without assurance that theirstatements will be protected
from discovery, insured parties may be forced to an uncomfortable choice. They must either reveal
information potentially adverse to their own interest, which will then be freely available to adverse
parties, or risk losing coverage under the insurance contract and policy cancellation. In some cases, the
insured may be contractually bound to disclose to the insurer information that might be used against him
or her in a subsequent criminal proceeding. See, e.g., People v. Ryan, 25 Ill. 2d 233, 184 N.E.2d 853,
854 (1962), rev'd, People v. Ryan, 30111. 2d 456,458, 197 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1964) (Prosecutor in county
court sought defendant's statement to insurer which had been turned over to her criminal defense
attorney. The Illinois Supreme Court asserted that the privilege against self-incrimination was inap-
plicable to such materials.).
92 See supra text accompanying notes 69-78.
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. The court's failure to observe the underlying
policies of the Rule causes concern because policy articulation and application are the means by which
lower courts are able to take prior cases and apply doctrine to new fact situations.
95. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
96. Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at 400, 706 P.2d at 217.
97 See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
98 Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at 400, 706 P.2d at 217.
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would come within the attorney-client privilege,99 and this certainty more
logically comports with the court's discussion of expectation of con-
fidentiality. Although the court halted its reasoning process after articulat-
ing the policies of attorney-client privilege, 10 0 the court nevertheless con-
cluded that statements made by insured parties to their liability carriers
following an accident are protected work product. 101
B. Effect of the Court's Fusion of Privilege and Work Product
Doctrines
The reasoning and conclusion reached in Heidebrink result in a peculiar
fusion of two distinct doctrines. The decision potentially impedes the
application of work product doctrine because lower courts relying on the
opinion will encounter difficulty in attempting to reconcile the Heidebrink
rationale with standard work product doctrine analysis. The decision also
has negative effects on privilege doctrine because the protected interest in
Heidebrink received only limited immunity from discovery, yet the court
characterized that interest as qualitatively equivalent to interests protected
absolutely by privilege.
1. Application of Heidebrink to Work Product Doctrine
Lower courts in Washington will now know that statements made by
insured parties to their liability carriers following an accident are protected
from discovery by Washington Civil Rule 26(b)(3). 10 2 The Heidebrink
decision is inapplicable beyond the context of insured-insurer communica-
tions, however, because the court's analysis did not articulate what con-
stitutes anticipation of litigation in a post-accident insurance investiga-
tion. 103 Nevertheless, the Heidebrink court declared that its decision rested
on the anticipation of litigation question. 104 As a result, lower courts will
look to the decision for guidance when faced with the need to make
anticipation of litigation determinations in contexts other than post-acci-
dent communications between insured and insurer.
99. While many of the client's reasons for speaking to an attorney come under the umbrella of
seeking legal advice, such reasons are not restricted to anticipation of litigation. The client may seek
advice, for example, regarding contractual obligations. Such an inquiry is not necessarily related to
preparing for litigation.
100. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text for the policies of attorney-client privilege.
101. Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at 401,706 P.2d at 217.
102. Id.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 80-94.
104. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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Lower courts will find attempts to apply the Heidebrink decision con-
fusing and awkward, even when faced with only a few dissimilar facts
within an insurance investigation. Courts may need to make determinations
regarding nonparty witness statements in circumstances essentially analo-
gous to Heidebrink. The Heidebrink court articulated an expectation of
confidentiality stemming from the insured's contractual relationship with
the insurance company as the policy justification and rationale for deter-
mining that work product protection applied to defendant Moriwaki's
statement. 105 The decision implies that work product protection should not
extend to nonparty witness statements because no expectation of con-
fidentiality arises, even though Rule 26(b)(3) provides no basis for such an
assertion. 10 6 Lower courts must now either attempt to apply a rationale
based on policy grounds that do not comport with standard work product
doctrine analysis, or conclude that the Heidebrink decision offers no
guidance on the anticipation of litigation issue.
The Heidebrink court's rationale and conclusion also lead to an ana-
lytical anomoly. The privilege for attorney-client communications can only
be asserted by the client, or on the client's behalf, because the benefit of
protecting a confidential relationship runs to the client alone. 107 The court
chose to protect the insured's statement as work product. As a result, either
the insured or the attorney may assert the immunity. 108 The Heidebrink
decision allows attorneys to withhold materials in their own right, yet the
court's rationale offers no policy justification for attorneys doing so. 109 This
further illustrates the court's misplaced reliance on expectation of con-
fidentiality in work product analysis.
2. Negative Impact of Heidebrink on Privilege Doctrine
The fusion of privilege and work product doctrine created by the
Heidebrink court engenders an argument that the confidential relationships
105. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 2 and text accompanying note 18. It may be that the court took great pain
specifically to prevent initial post-accident insurance investigations from coming within the scope of
work product protection unless a need for confidentiality is present. See infra text accompanying notes
132-34. The court, in so doing, has grafted a requirement onto the Rule that does not exist in its plain
meaning.
107. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
109. Because one of the goals of work product doctrine is to free the attorney from intrusions into
the trial preparation process, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text, the attorney benefits from
the protection. Yet the Heidebrink court's analysis identified no interest of the attorney. See supra notes
72-78 and accompanying text. The most disturbing aspect of the attorney's right to assert the immunity
is that allowing the attorney to do so flies in the face of the court's announced reason for allowing the
protection to apply: the needs of the client.
1316
Vol. 61:1301, 1986
Discoverability of Insured's Statement
protected by common law privileges may now deserve no more than
qualified immunity from discovery. Under the court's analysis, the pro-
tected interests identified in Heidebrink are no different in character from
those protected absolutely by attorney-client privilege doctrine.'1 10 Yet the
court granted the "confidential relationship" in Heidebrink"1 1 only
qualified immunity from discovery. 112 The court in Heidebrink may be
interpreted to have signalled that absolute protection for attorney-client or
other protected relationships is no longer warranted.113
C. Reasons for the Heidebrink Court's Confidentiality Analysis
Amicus briefs in Heidebrink v. Moriwaki offered arguments both for and
against protection from discovery for Moriwaki's statement. These briefs
presented work product doctrine and extension of attorney-client privilege
as separate and distinct concepts. 1 4 The court failed to acknowledge those
distinctions, instead combining the two doctrines in its analysis.115 It is
apparent that the Heidebrink court found the insured's interest in maintain-
ing the confidentiality of post-accident communications with the insurer
worth protecting. The court might have protected that interest through
alternative courses incorporating singular adherence to one doctrine or the
other, or through creation of a new insured-insurer communication doc-
trine. However, each of these paths would have presented difficulties of its
own to the court.
1. Extension of Attorney-Client Privilege to Insured-Insurer
Communications
The Heidebrink court's emphasis on preserving the benefit of the in-
sured's contractual relationship with the insurer, leading to the court's
110. The interest protected in Heidebrink is an "expectation of confidentiality," without which the
insured may hesitate to disclose all relevant facts, hindering eventual representation by the selected
attorney. Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at 400, 706 P.2d at 216-17. This is identical to the interest underlying
attorney-client privilege. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
112. The substantial need test by which adverse parties can ask the court to compel disclosure of
protected ordinary work product qualifies work product protection. See supra notes 3, 20, and
accompanying text.
113. It seems unlikely that the court intended this result. However, the privilege doctrine may be
destined to receive discretionary application utilizing a balancing approach, rather than blanket
absolute protection upon recognition. MCCORMICK, supra note 43, at 187. If the court sought this result
it could have more effectively achieved it by direct action.
114. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Washington State Trial Lawyers Ass'n (arguing against protec-
tion); Brief of Amicus Curiae, Washington Ass'n of Defense Counsel and Nat'l Ass'n of Independent -
Insurers (arguing for protection), Heidebrink v. Moriwaki, 104 Wn. 2d 392, 706 P.2d 212 (1985).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 80-101.
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recognition of a protected confidential relationship, 1 6 indicates that the
court was persuaded to protect Moriwaki's statement by arguments tradi-
tionally supporting privilege doctrine.11 7 The court might have protected
the insured's relationship with the insurer by recognizing an extension of
attorney-client privilege, as a majority of other state courts have done. "18
The scope of immunity afforded by the privilege, however, may be respon-
sible for the court's choice not to do so.
Protecting the insured's statement to the liability carrier from discovery
under the work product rule, rather than under attorney-client privilege,
significantly affects the degree of protection provided. Disclosure of ordi-
nary work product can be compelled by an adverse party who makes the
proper showing of substantial need, a decision wholly within the discretion
of the trial judge. 119 Under attorney-client privilege, however, discovery is
barred absolutely. 120 While other courts have rejected extension of at-
torney-client privilege to insured-insurer communications on doctrinal
grounds,121 concern with the scope of immunity may have presented the
Heidebrink court with a more pragmatic reason for doing so.
Given the Heidebrink court's preoccupation with attorney-client priv-
ilege considerations in its work product analysis, the court's refusal to
extend the privilege must have stemmed from a belief that the interests
served did not warrant absolute protection from adverse parties. The court
chose, therefore, to adhere to a liberal discovery policy because those
materials, as protected work product, may be acquired by adverse parties
under the proper circumstances.1 22
Although bringing insured-insurer communications within the scope of
attorney-client privilege presents analytical difficulties, 123 such an analysis
is not as strained as that ultimately offered by the court. 124 However, only a
radically modified privilege theory could have achieved a result analogous
to that in Heidebrink.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
117. Two rationales identified by the Heidebrink court, the insured's expectation of confidentiality
and contractual obligation to disclose all known facts, have influenced other courts to extend attorney-
client privilege to post-accident insured-insurer communications. See supra note 53 and accompanying
text.
118. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. In addition, protection under attorney-client
privilege has evidentiary impact beyond the discovery stage that work product protection does not. See
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6. § 2017, at 132-33.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
122. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. The Washington Supreme Court had pre-
viously affirmed its intent to follow a liberal discovery policy. See Barnum v. State, 72 Wn. 2d 928, 931.
435 P.2d 678, 680 (1967).
123. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 80-101 and accompanying text,
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2. Recognition of an Independent, Modified Privilege
The Heidebrink court might have solved the perceived degree-of-protec-
tion problem by recognizing a separate modified privilege apart from that
of attorney-client. This privilege could be based on the modern relationship
between insurer and insured, granting only qualified immunity similar to
that afforded by the work product rule. 125 However, recognition by the
court of such a qualified privilege would have been nearly without prece-
dent. 126
Establishing an insured-insurer modified privilege presents the pos-
siblity of considerable drawbacks. The court might open the door to claims
for recognition of similar interests under the doctrine. Other "confidential"
relationships currently not recognized at common law, such as accountant-
client, 127 might be equally deserving of protection. The court would
eventually be forced to announce the limits of a modified privilege doc-
trine, potentially a question of considerable difficulty. Recognition of
limited privileges might also tend to dilute the force of existing absolute
privileges.128 An insured-insurer modified privilege theory is a far from
ideal solution. Not surprisingly, the court did not articulate such a theory
even though it conceptually most closely comports with the rationale and
result ultimately offered. 129
Given the court's position that both an absolute or a modified privilege
analysis would have undesirable consequences, the court turned to work
product doctrine and, inevitably, the anticipation of litigation requirement.
125. Essentially, the court achieved this practical result under the label of work product doctrine.
See supra text accompanying notes 100-01 and infra text accompanying note 134.
126. Jackson v. Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc., 49 FR.D. 134, 136-37 (N.D. W.Va. 1970);
Gottlieb v. Bresler, 24 F.R.D. 371, 372 (D.D.C. 1959) (no privilege exists for insured-insurer
communications). But see Brakhage v. Graff, 190 Neb. 53, 206 N.W.2d 45, 47 (1973) (An insured's
statement to insurer was held to be within attorney-client privilege for the sole purpose of the Nebraska
discovery statute which, as stated by the court, allowed the following: "Upon motion of any party
showing good cause therefor the court may order production of any document not privileged.").
127. Wigmore asserted that the common law required four fundamental conditions be met to find a
privileged relationship: (1) communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed; (2) confidentiality must be essential to maintaining a satisfactory relationship between the
parties; (3) the relationship must be one that community opinion dictates should be sedulously fostered;
and (4) the injury of disclosure must be greater than the benefits of same. J. WIoMORE, supra note 44,
§ 2285, at 527. Failure to meet one or more of these requirements prevented finding a privilege at
common law in such relationships as those between clients and accountants, sureties, bankers,
journalists, and others. Id. § 2286, at 528-30.
128. Since the character of the insured's interest is the same as that protected by traditional
common law privileges, it may be argued that common law privileges would not warrant a greater
degree of protection than that offered under a modified privilege theory. For a similar line of reasoning
presented by the Heidebrink decision, see supra text accompanying notes 110-12.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01 and infra text accompanying note 134.
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3. Reasoned Analysis of the Events Triggering Investigation
Work product doctrine afforded the Heidebrink court an opportunity to
provide limited protection from discovery to the insured-insurer relation-
ship. Because federal and other courts had analyzed the discoverability of
statements made in the post-accident insurance investigation context under
the auspices of work product doctrine, 130 it was not unusual for the
Washington court to do so.
In deciding the anticipation of litigation issue, however, the Heidebrink
court could have focused not on the preexisting insured-insurer relation-
ship, but instead on a reasoned analysis of the events that led to the
recording of Moriwaki's statement by the investigator. That analysis would
properly have been directed at the motive for recording the statement. 131
However, had the court found that the accident and surrounding circum-
stances had provoked an investigation made in anticipation of litigation, it
would have faced another dilemma. Logically, any materials gathered
following a similar set of facts would likewise be prepared in anticipation of
litigation. Future determinations in lower courts would then extend work
product immunity to such routine investigations without considering the
source of the materials sought. Protection would be granted whether that
source was the insured party, another party, a" nonparty witness, or a
physical investigation by the insurer. The court indicated that this result
was unacceptable by stating: "broad protection for all investigations con-
"1132ducted by an insurer . . . is . . . an unsatisfactory answer ... .
Instead, again favoring a liberal discovery policy, 33 the court offered an
opinion focused on the insured which granted limited protection to post-
accident insured-insurer communications, but could not be used to extend
work product protection to insurance investigations in any other context. 134
Thus, when faced with a slate of unacceptable doctrinal choices, the court
refused to proceed wholly under any doctrine. This choice will prove to be
the most objectionable of all, because of its confusing fusion of two distinct
doctrines. 135
D. The Heidebrink Court Could Have Focused on the Events Triggering
Investigation
Fear of extending broad discovery protection to insurance investigations
130. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
132. Heidebrink, 104 Wn. 2d at 399, 706 P.2d at 216.
133. See supra text accompanying note 122.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
135. See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
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motivated the Heidebrink court to offer its constrained work product
analysis. Numerous courts have recognized, as the Heidebrink court did,
that the ordinary course of an insurance company's business frequently
entails litigation. 136 A perceived need for open discovery has fostered
reluctance by some courts to extend work product immunity to routine
post-accident investigations. 137 This consideration has contributed to a
number of decisions subject to analytical criticism. 138 However, a less
convoluted solution for the dilemma exists which would have allowed the
court to adopt the work product doctrine under a logical rationale.
Efforts by many courts to reconcile work product immunity with a broad
discovery policy have focused on the anticipation of litigation require-
ment. 139 Courts could instead look to the substantial need test, by which
Rule 26(b)(3) immunity can be overcome, 140 to mitigate any undue re-
straint on discovery which the Rule might otherwise cause. 141 The only
materials properly withheld from discovery under the Rule 26(b)(3) frame-
work are those materials for which an adverse party cannot demonstrate
substantial need, or those materials whose substantial equivalent can be
obtained elsewhere by the adverse party without undue hardship. 142 There-
fore, Rule 26(b)(3) allows an adverse party to discover any materials that
are actually needed for the preparation of his or her case. Proper exercise of
the discretionary "substantial need" determination by trial judges would
prevent Rule 26(b)(3) from insulating all documents in an insurance
company's files from discovery. Parties seeking work product protection
136. See, e.g., AtlantaCoca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 61 ER.D. 115,118 (N.D.
Ga. 1972); Heidebrink v. Moriwaki, 104 Wn. 2d 392, 399, 706 P.2d 212, 216 (1985); Henry Enters.,
Inc. v. Smith, 225 Kan. 615, 592 P.2d 915, 920 (1979).
137. These courts indicate belief that work product protection in this instance threatens the policy
of open discovery by limiting access too severely. See, e.g., Rakus v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R., 76
F.R.D. 145,146 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 61 ER.D.
115, 118-19 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 ER.D. 367,
372-73 (N.D. I11. 1972).
138. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
139. The "ordinary course of business" exception, see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text,
is an example of such efforts. See Comment, supra note 28, at 852.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
141. See Comment, supra note 28, at 853, suggesting that the practice ofgrafting additional factors
onto Rule 26(b)(3) which function to deny initial work product protection, such as the ordinary course
of business exception, see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text, upsets the balance of the Rule.
The Rule was was designed deliberately to impede discovery of trial preparation materials. The
Comment concludes courts should abandon the exception and instead follow the framework of the Rule.
Id. at 855.
142. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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would still be required to show that materials had been gathered in response
to a fact pattern giving rise to anticipation of litigation. 143 The trial judge
would still retain discretion to order production of protected materials, if an
adverse party made a proper showing. 144
The Heidebrink court could have looked to the substantial need compo-
nent of Rule 26(b)(3) to reconcile difficulties raised by a perception that the
Rule functions to limit discovery too severely. The court then would have
been able to focus on the events leading up to the investigation, rather than
on a privilege analysis. A reasoned analysis of the events triggering
investigation would have provided lower courts in this state guidance for
determining when insurance investigations are conducted in anticipation of
litigation, as required for protection under the work product rule. 145 The
confused state of decisional law on this issue, 146 coupled with the per-
vasiveness of liability insurance in our society, 147 makes such guidance
essential. At the very least, such an analysis would have placed the decision
on proper analytical grounds, and maintained the distinctions between
privileges and work product doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Heidebrink decision protects from discovery as work product state-
ments made by insured parties to their liability insurance carriers following
accidents. The court, however, extended this protection in order to preserve
the insured's confidential relationship with the insurer. Thus, the court's
rationale relied on policies and considerations derived from privilege
doctrine, not those of work product. Seeking to serve a policy allowing
broad discovery, the court was unwilling to extend the absolute protection
from discovery afforded to privileged materials, and instead granted
qualified immunity under the work product rule. The court's fusion of two
distinct legal concepts creates analytical anomalies, is detrimental to
privilege doctrine, and raises inappropriate barriers to work product pro-
tection.
Analyzing the anticipation of litigation question by focusing on the
nature of the events that stimulated the investigation would have placed the
143. See supra text accompanying note 18.
144. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
145. See supra text accompanying note 18. The precise form that analysis would take would be
determined by the court. The test proposed by Professors Wright and Miller would be an appropriate
starting point. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2024. at 198.
146. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
147. See Behrns v. Burke, 89 S.D. 96, 229 N.W.2d 86, 95 (1975) (Dunn, C.J.. dissenting). The
extensive existence of liability insurance leads to a likelihood that lower courts will make such
anticipation of litigation determinations.
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decision on appropriate grounds. Such an analysis would also have pro-
vided lower courts criteria for determining the anticipation of litigation
question in any post-accident insurance investigation. Had the court made
such an analysis, reaching the same result, its decision would have ex-
tended work product immunity to post-accident insurance investigations in
general. The court chose not to do so, again favoring a broad discovery
policy. However, any hardships created by granting work product protec-
tion to routine insurance investigations could be mitigated through the
discretionary substantial need test for compelling discovery of ordinary
work product. Because the court declined to follow the framework of Rule
26(b)(3), the decision offers no guidance to lower courts outside of the
narrowest possible reading of the facts of the case. The undesirable ramifi-
cations which now flow from Heidebrink do not result from inevitable
analysis, but from incomplete analysis.
Ronald S. Dinning
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